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PROBABILISTIC APPROACH TO EMP ASSESSMENT 
ABSTRACT 
The development of nuclear EMP hardness requirements must account for 
uncertainties in the environment, in interaction and coupling, and in the 
susceptibility of subsystems and components. Typical uncertainties of the 
last two kinds are briefly summarized, and an assessment methodology is out­
lined, based on a probabilistic approach that encompasses the basic concepts 
of reliability. It is suggested that statements of survivability be made 
compatible with system reliability. Validation of the approach taken for 
simple antenna/circuit systems is performed with experiments and calculations 
that involve a Transient Electromagnetic Range, numerical antenna modeling, 
separate device failure data, and a failure analysis computer program. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The development of nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) hardness require­
ments and the specification of EMP hardening or protection for a system must 
account for uncertainties in all areas from the EMP environment to system 
behavior. For example, uncertainties exist in statements about the environ­
ment, particularly how this environment interacts with and propagates through­
out the system. Similarly, there are fundamental uncertainties in the compon­
ents, units, and subsystems that are to be subjected to those uncertain envi­
ronments. Uncertainties appear in the form of random variations, systematic 
errors, and judgmental factors. This paper briefly reviews some of the uncer­
tainties in the areas of interaction and coupling, and susceptibility, and it 
suggests in some detail an approach that can deal with such uncertainties in 
assessing a system for hardness specification. This is by no means a complete 
review, but we obtained information on some major programs from the EMP Lead 
Laboratories of the Services and from some of their contractors. The suggested 
approach is probabilistic in nature and encompasses the basic concepts of 
reliability in making statements concerning hardness and survivability. 
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2.0 GENERAL NATURE OF UNCERTAINTIES 
Uncertainties arise in all phases of vulnerability assessment analysis, 
due to model inadequacies, testing uncertainties, lack of complete knowledge 
of system parameters, etc. These uncertainties must be accommodated in any 
analysis, whether it be a deterministic worst-case analysis or a probabilistic 
analysis where the uncertainties are considered to be nondeterministic. 
In risk assessment programs, uncertainties are classified into several 
types. For vulnerability assessment, three types of uncertainties—random, 
systematic, and judgmental—can be defined. Although there is no universal 
agreement on the definitions of these terms or even for the need to differ­
entiate among different types of uncertainty, it is frequently interesting and 
important to distinguish between uncertainties. In particular, it may be of 
interest to separate the effect of uncertainties due to "inherent" random 
variation in the properties of the system from the effect of those in the 
analysis techniques. The latter can sometimes be reduced by improved tech­
niques, whereas the former cannot. Below we suggest a use of terms that would 
be appropriate for vulnerability assessment. 
2.1 RANDOM UNCERTAINTIES 
Random uncertainties are variations in measured response due to inherent 
natural variations in the physical properties, operation, or behavior of a 
physical entity. Thus, the variation in the susceptibility (response level at 
which failure occurs) of like components is considered a random variation 
(uncertainty). This variation has many causes, such as manufacturing varia­
tion, variations in the basic elements within the component, etc., and it 
includes measurement variation. Similarly, random variation in an incident 
electric field can be due to environmental variation, random variation in the 
source, directional variations, etc. All of these variations are outside the 
direct control of the analyst and will always be a source of uncertainty in 
the analysis. 
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2.2 SYSTEMATIC UNCERTAINTIES 
Systematic uncertainties are variations in response due to imperfect 
modeling, testing, design, analysis, etc. The variation introduced into the 
analysis by modeling (analysis, computer- or scale-model testing) introduces a 
constant, although unknown, uncertainty in response. (For example, any mathe­
matical model of coupling is only an approximation to the real system.) This 
constant uncertainty in the response exists as long as the model is used in 
the vulnerability assessment analysis. 
2.3 JUDGMENTAL UNCERTAINTIES 
Judgmental uncertainties are variations in response introduced by using 
subjective opinions about unknown parameters. Frequently, many of the param­
eters in a vulnerability assessment are unknown and unobtainable. THUS, it is 
necessary to depend on the judgment of experts for the likely values of the 
parameters. Anyone who makes such a judgment will be doing so without complete 
knowledge, thus introducing uncertainty into the assessment. For example a 
vulnerability assessment of a system must account for the environment. Since 
it is impossible to know all details about the environment some judgments must 
be made. Although judgmental uncertainty influences the analysis in much the 
same way as a systematic uncertainty, a separation of the uncertainty due to 
modeling, testing, etc., from that introduced by subjective judgments is 
clearly advisable in most situations. 
3.0 UNCERTAINTIES IN COUPLING ANO SUSCEPTIBILITY 
3.1 INTERACTION AND COUPLING 
3.1.1 Nat',;re of Uncertainties 
Vulnerability assessment includes the evaluation of EMP-induced currents 
on conductors that might direct the energy to susceptible circuitry. Various 
approaches are used to evaluate these currents, the most popular of which are 
full-scale simulation tests, computer simulations, and scale-model tests sup­
plemented with analysis. Another alternative to full-scale testing is the 
technique of "current injection" at certain points of the system. A fifth 
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method of assessment is the evaluation of the EMP response of a similar, often 
simpler, system. (The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has 
published a set of data on external coupling of EMPs to generic structures. 
These data provide estimates of EMP-induced current levels.) In several asses­
sment efforts, more than one technique has been used. 
In the absence of coupling data from actual high-altitude nuclear bursts, 
heavy reliance is placed on data generated from full-scale simulation tests. 
Such tests have also been used to validate other simulation techniques. 
However, full-scale simulation tests are in themselves prone to uncertainties, 
which are reviewed and discussed below. There is a large amount of data on 
simulators and on the taking and processing of data from them. 
The nature of the source of interaction and coupling uncertainties are 
closely connected to the type of system being evaluated. For example, Army 
communication equipment can be tested in a HEMP (high-altitude electromagnetic 
pulse) environment similar to that anticipated in field use, with the possible 
exception of very long lines connected to the equipment. In contrast, most 
aircraft and missile tests are conducted on the ground while attempting to 
simulate the vehicle in a flight condition. Problems of extrapolating the test 
data to the desired operational case is less severe when the system is more 
closely simulated in both its physical configuration and general operating 
environment. 
Important coupling paths for Army ground communication equipment are from 
the external field to cables and antennas, and from these to the internal 
equipment. For aircraft and missiles, the EMP-induced effects enter the 
system through various points-of-entry (POE), such as apertures and external 
antenna systems. The aircraft, however, is still a localized system, whereas 
cables of communication systems may run for kilometers. 
The coupling assessment of aircraft has relied more heavily on system-
level simulation tests than on less successful analytical and computer simula­
tion techniques. On the other hand, the computer simulation approach has been 
more successful for Army communication equipment. Varicis codes have been 
developed and validated with simulation tests in well-controlled configura­
tions, then used to predict currents on long cable runs where simulator tests 
are not feasible. 
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The Navy has also performed many coupling assessments on various ships, 
using tne EMPRESS EMP-simulation facility. The Er1P fields couple to the 
various a.itenna systems and cables aDoard the ships, which in turn propagate 
the energy conductively through apertures to susceptiole circuitry within the 
hull of the ship. The direct coupling of the ErtP fields to internal cables is 
minimal, in contrast to aircraft coupling modes. This property of ships makes 
scale-model testing for evaluation of coupling an attractive alternative to 
full-scale ship simulation tests. 
Solution of the coupling problem by computer methods is also attractive 
because of the availability of many efficient numerical techniques and 
computer programs. However, the greatest accuracy has been obtained in the 
prediction of external coupling levels, such as coupling to external antennas 
(free space and lossy ground) and to the external conducting surface of an' 
aircraft or missile, for external coupling, much validation work has been 
performed, so that tne numerical modeling techniques can be used with high 
confidence. There has apparently been only limited success in the prediction 
of internal cable currents, particularly the EMP-induced currents in indivi­
dual wires. Very extensive and complete descriptive information is needed, 
unless the configurations are quite simple. Internal coupling estimations 
have been attempted for complicated systems (aircraft and ships), and aircraft 
predictions have been validated. 
Scale-model tests have been used quite extensively for external coupling 
predictions, and this technique has been validated. Recently, the scale-mod-jl 
approach has also been used for making some internal coupling predictions for 
a ship, and the results indicate much promise for this approach. Such scale-
model tests should be quite successful and accurate as long as geometrically 
small details in the full-scale system can be neglected. This implies that 
very small apertures cannot be allowed to become major POE for energy into the 
interior of the ship. For this reason, the technique should be quite useful 
for ships, but less useful for aircraft. However, scale-model tests are useful 
to predict external coupling to tne aircraft. 
We do not wish to imply here that one and one only coupling technique has 
been used for each system. This discussion "efers only to the more common 
methodology used. Coupling data for aircraft for instance have been generated 
by computer simulation when such data were not available or were difficult to 
obtain with system simulation tests. An example might be an aircraft with a 
long, trailing wire antenna. 
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3.1.2 Typical Uncertainties 
In this section, we review typical uncertainties in the various coupling 
assessment techniques. We place emphasis on "reasonable and achievable" accur­
acies, based on well-run tests or analyses. The emphasis is on uncertainties 
in amplitude in the time domain, since electronic vulnerability is usually much 
more sensitive to changes in amplitude than to small changes in frequency 
content. 
A. Full-Scale System Tests. The uncertainties in full-scale tests include 
measurement errors, extrapolations of test data, and intrasystem and 
intersystem variations. 
Measurement Uncertainties. These include simulation variation errors 
(from shot-to-shot), instrumentation errors, and data processing errors. 
Simulator field errors appear to be primarily due to shot-to-shot varia­
tions in the discharge circuits, waveform variations, and variations in non-
2 3 
principal (1/R -1/R ) components. The last two appear to be minor. Exam­
ination of a dozen or so simulators suggests that a reasonable and achievable 
error due to simulator field uncertainty is +2 dB. 
Instrumentation errors include those in current and charge sensors; 
circuit elements such as cables, alternators, and power dividers; integrators 
and differentiators; oscilloscopes; records; and such subs stems as microwave 
telemetry, screenboxes, ADSET data acquisition, and a sim lar DASET system. 
A well-controlled and calibrated instrumentation sy .em has about the 
smallest error and uncertainty of any aspect of a coupli ig assessment, accord­
ing to studies by several companies. For example, sen- >r errors can be held 
to 1 dB, as can integrator and differentiator errors up to 50 MHz; scope errors 
can be made almost negligible. A good microwave telemetry or screenbox system 
will have less than 1 dB error over its dynamic range; an ADSET or DASET data 
acquisition system can be similarly designed. An overall error of +3 dB is 
reasonable for an entire instrumentation system. 
Data processing errors can occur during the manipulations of the recorded 
raw data (digitization, Fourier transformation, etc.), which produce the final 
scope, film, or recorded f- or t-domain responses, rtost of the individual 
errors are small. 
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Data processing error estimates nave ranged from +6 dB in one system to 
essentially zero in another system, in frequency intervals extending to 1 GHz. 
The maximum error in a QASET or AOSET processing system is about +3 dB, in the 
absence of nonlinear effects, which can in principle be removed from the data. 
This seems to be a reasonable and achievable figure. 
Extrapolation Uncertainties. The measured wire currents from a test 
program must be extrapolated to threat conditions, and this usually introduces 
additional uncertainties. The extrapolation provides corrections for incident 
field amplitude and wave shape, incidence angle, and polarization, and a change 
from ground test environment to threat environment. The .ground plane correc­
tion can be important for aircraft assessment when in-flight currents are to 
be extrapolated from test data. Ground conductivity effects can also be impor­
tant when the system to be tested is to be deployed in physical environments 
quite different from those at the simulator site. For instance, estimates of 
the effect of ground conductivity on the reflected wave for various angles of 
the incident wave and antenna height indicate that it could cause at least a 
4-dtJ change in coupling response. 
For an aircrift where free-field penetration into the interior through 
2 POE is the critical means of internal excitation, Rockwell has used the 
surface magnetic field (H ) at the various POE as the extrapolation quantity. 
When more than one POE may be driving a given internal wire to an unknown 
extent compared to other POE, the resultant uncertainty is referred to by 
Rockwell as the POE location error, an additional source of extrapolation 
uncertainty. 
In Rockwell's assessment method 1 (by computer progi am) the extrapolation 
ratio H s (threat) r e e s P a c e / H (simulator) is estimated by computer programs. 
The inherent error has been evaluated by comparison with Air Force Weapons 
Laboratory (AFWL) simulator data. For the EC-135 aircraft, Rockwell estimated 
the POE error as varying from wire to wire between +j> and +10 dti. These errors 
should be treated as independent to arrive at the extrapolation error. 
In Rockwell's assessment method 2 (oy scale-model aircraft data), an 
estimate of the extrapolation ratio error was not separated from the POE error. 
The net error in predicted thraat wire currents due to both sources was compu­
ted to lie between +7 and +_12 dB, depending on the orientation of the aircraft. 
This was defined as "simulation error" by Rockwell. 
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Intrasystem and Inter system Variations. EMP-induced wire currents occur 
when switching from power-on to power-off operation. In addition, variations 
have jeen observed in EMP couplings to the same circuits in identical systems. 
Even within a given system, variations in internal coupling occur from day to 
day because of changes in physical layout and changes in electrical configura­
tion. These variations have been reported for aircraft, but they likely apply 
to other systems as well. These variations are strongly system dependent, and 
data on them are scarce. 
For the EC-135, Rockwell reports a power on-off uncertainty of jHO dB. 3 Morgan reports a spread of 20 dB at identical measurement points in 
different samples of one aircraft type. 
B. Computer Simulation. Computer simulation has been used to make predic­
tions for both external and internal coupling. In terms of uncertainty, how­
ever, better results have been achieved in external coupling. In the follow­
ing discussion, computer simulation predictions are compared to measured 
values, and the differences are attributed to prediction errors. The full-
scale system test errors discussed in the previous section can produce a total 
uncertainty between +5 and +6 dB.* The adequacy of any computer simulation 
technique should be judged with these numbers in mind. 
In external coupling cases, antennas, cables, and external system envel­
opes have received much attention. Antennas have been analyzed in free space 
and over ground (both lossy and perfect) with integral equation techniques. A 
review of such simulations performed by Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL) and 
LLNL shows that peak response time-domain errors in current should be no 
higher than +4 dB. Computer code predictions of aircraft surface current tend 
to have error ranges somewhat higher than this. 
Cable coupling studies have been performed using transmission line theory. 
Cables over perfect and lossy grounds have been modeled. The largest uncer­
tainties in specifying the parameters of the model have been in the terminating 
•Measurement and data processing errors are independent random variables and 
are combined in the usual fashion (i.e., square root of the sum of squares). 
Instrumentation errors are not random and are added linearly. 
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impedances. It appears that +3-d8 accuracies can be achieved in predicting 
the EMP-induced current entering a system on a single coaxial or multiwire 
shielded transmission line, although in many cases only +6-dB accuracies have 
been reported. Skin currents and charges induced on the exterior metallic 
envelopes of systems have been computed with integral equations (i.e., wire-
mesh models) and finite-difference schemes. Objects in free space and over 
ground have been considered. In particular, aircraft have been extensively 
analyzed in this fashion. If the modeling is done well, uncertainties can be 
considerably less than ^10 dB. Cases have been reported where errors of +3 dB 
have been obtained for aircraft, using finite-difference codes. 
Interior coupling predictions have been made by first computing the 
currents and charges induced on the exterior envelope of the system, as 
described in the previous paragraph. These are used to define equivalent 
sources (both electric and magnetic) on apertures, which in turn drive internal 
cable systems. These attempts have been characterized by large uncertainties 
because of the difficulty in modeling complex apertures and random-run multi-
branch cables. In addition, it is often not possible to characterize precisely 
the load impedances. Error intervals for internal aircraft cable currents, 
computed analytically by Rockwell, using bethe aperture penetration theory 
and circuit analysis, have been large, typically 10 dB and more. 
C. Scale-Model Tests. For several reasons, scale-model tests have not been 
as popular in EMP coupling assessment as full-scale system simulator tests and 
analysis. Chief among these reasons is the difficulty of taking measurements 
in the picosecond time regime. Furthermore, the scaling laws for nonmetallic 
objects such as dielectrics with finite conductivity are nonlinear in frequency, 
thus making scaling very difficult, dost reliable results are achieved for 
metallic objects, either in free space or over perfectly conducting ground 
planes. Until recently, scale-model tests have been used for making external 
coupling measurements only. Recently, internal coupling predictions for a 
ship have been performed by LLNL, and the predictions have been compared to 
full-scale simulator test data. Scale-model tests have been used for aircraft 
predictions by the University of Michigan. 
The scale-model transient facilities are prone to measurement uncertain­
ties. LLNL reports a peak time-domain uncertainty in the simulator field of 
less than ±1 dB. Instrumentation pics data processing errors are estimated to 
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be less than +4 dB. The University of Michigan test facility is reported to 
have a simulator field uncertainty less than +1 dB at frequencies below 2 GHz 
(and probably about the same up to 6 GHz), with instrumentation errors less 
than +_3 dB up to 6 GHz. Because scale models are usually larger than about 
1/700 size, this frequency range scales to more than 8.5 MHz for the full-size 
aircraft. Data processing errors in the Michigan facility typically appear to 
be +3 dB, with wide variations over the frequency band for a given scale model. 
The University of Michigan model aircraft data contain an extrapolation 
error (called "simulation error" by Rockwell, as mentioned in the preceding 
section) between +7 and +J0 dB for skin current predictions. 
The comparison of LLrtL predictions with full-scale simulator measurements 
by the Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC) for the Canadian ship Huron shows 
a discrepancy between +7 dB and ±10 dB for the antennas (due to measurement 
errors) and between +2 and +20 dB for internal cables. 
D. Current Injection Tests. Surface current injection testing has been 
performed on such systems as aircraft so as to excite the first one or two 
natural modes reasonably accurately, compared to EMP. But the surface current 
response has been well matched over only part of the EMP spectrum. The meager 
amount of published data on systems suggests a reasonable and achievable error 
of +_6 dB in derived EMP surface temporal response. 
E. LLNL Modular Data. Modular data have been generated by LLNL for various 
generic classes of structures, using both computer models and scale-model 
tests. These modules p -wide quick-look external coupling estimates of induced 
quantities of interest, i. as current, voltage, power, and energy. The data 
are provided in parameterized form and can be easily scaled. Generic classes 
considered include straight wires and loops in free space, whips and loops on 
boxes, and whips and loops on cylinders. When compared to actual system test 
results, the module prediction accuracies ranged between 1 and 9 dB. The 
accuracy is best for structures that deviate little from the generic form and 
worsens as the deviation increases. 
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3.2 SUSCEPTIBILITY 
As an element of vulnerability assessment and hardening, subsystem and 
component susceptibility very rarely can be stated in terms of the exact 
environment. Usually, susceptibility is determined for a class of environ­
ments that in some sense approximates the actual case. The determination or 
specification of the class relies very strongly on trw interaction and coupling 
technology. Typical classes of environments are families of exponentially 
damped sinusoids of current or voltage that are used to drive cables or 
terminals of subsystem units. Another common class is a set of unipolar 
pulsed signals impressed on the terminals of individual components. 
Analytical investigations of the susceptibility of both circuits and 
components frequently employ the same classes of environmental signals. Thus, 
if susceptibility depends strongly on the details of an environment, large 
systematic error is introduced into the assessment. Such errors might not be 
recognized until a system test is performed. Clearly, the susceptibility of a 
subsystem or circuit depends on the interior configuration, thus errors are 
introduced by assumptions concerning this configuration. 
3.2.1 Subsystem Assessment 
Subsystem assessment work may be faced with different uncertainties, 
depending on the requirements. There is no standard practice in subsystems 
work. Instead, there are at least three different ways of approaching the 
problem: 
• Assessment relative to a specification placed on the interface of the 
subsystem. (For example, the B-l Aircraft or Advanced Airborne Command Post 
Pin Specification.) 
• Assessment that uses a replica or an extrapolation of the actual 
signal present in the system (as might be obtained from tests on a missile 
system). 
• Assessment that uses a "representation," because the nusiber of 
subsystems is so large that it precludes detailed analysis or investigation of 
all of them. This approach could introduce much judgmental uncertainty, as 
well as systematic errors. 
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A. Uncertainties in Methodology Development. By definition, a methodology 
should be a precise and orderly procedure. In practice, it could be a highly 
adaptive and ad hoc procedure, designed to fit the situation (e.g., to elimi­
nate or add tests). The compromises made in developing a methodology for a 
particular program are usually recognized, but their full significance in terms 
of the errors they generate may not be realized. Each methodology places 
emphasis on those phases of activity that are important to the project at hand. 
For example, a decision not to do any testing because of costs or other reasons 
would create a different set of uncertainties than if both tests and analyses 
were performed. The Advanced Airborne Command Post (AA8NCP) Assessment 
5 6 Program ' is an example of a strong methodology, heavily based on existing 
data, but backed up with tests on selected subsystems for the verification of 
predicted failure levels. Chapter 13 of the ONA EMP Handbook includes a 
generic approach to assessment and lists some of the issues involved. 
B. Uncertainties in Analysis. In subsystems susceptibility work, analysis 
can mean doing a simple screening of susceptible components on a penetration 
interface, or it can mean performing a detailed circuit analysis from the 
interface through several critical components. 
Uncertainties in analysis arise from the lack of suitable large-signal-
level models for components, the lack of information on circuit and device 
parameters, and a general inability to handle very large problems. Engineering 
judgment is used to simplify the circuit for analysis, and the errors are not 
always evaluated by experiment. 
C. Uncertainties in Testing. One of the largest uncertainties in testing may 
result from not being able to inject signals to all circuit terminals simultan­
eously. This is a good argument for doing a systems test at one point in the 
development cycle of the system. Ground loops and other problems unique to 
the type of interconnection may not show up in subsystem or unit tests. 
Another uncertainty arises in the simulation of the actual interface EMP 
signal. It is of interest to compare the set of test signals and their effect 
on the subsystem or unit with a set of possible EMP signals. The executive 
5 summary report of the AABNCP program contains information on the relative 
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accuracy of subsystem assessment analysis compared to certain test results. 
The results show that the analysis was generally conservative, with a range of 
0.35 to 744 for ratios of failure current (test) to failure current (analysis). 
D. Uncertainties in Data Handling. The nandling and processing of data in the 
bandwidths and quantities required for ErtP assessments appear to cause concern 
more for economic reasons than for the errors and uncertainties generated. 
Reference 6 discusses the handling of subsystem functional description data. 
E. Uncertainties in Configuration. A specification may or may not be closely 
tied to the actual operating environment from EMP-induced signals. Uncertainty 
arises from the use of an interface specification that permits subsystems 
design or assessment to conform to a uniform criterion. Regardless of the 
specification, however, a major uncertainty in tne analysis of subsystems 
results from assuming the basic configuration of the subsystem. Such an uncer­
tainty can not be easily resolved and can therefore cause large errors in 
assessment. An example is the assumption of no direct conduction path, where 
in fact there is one. Circuit analysis by computer plays a significant role 
in subsystem assessment, and it relies heavily on suitable determinations of 
configuration. 
3.2.2 Components Assessment 
There has been much investigation of the physics of failure, of various 
failure modes, and of thresholds for many different devices. Given the large 
number of devices, however, particularly the more susceptible solid-state 
components, it is rare that a single device can be controlled and studied in 
detail. Instead, through use of small samples, attempts have been made to 
derive general models that can be used with prediction techniques. Such models 
include the familiar power dissipation formula for a semiconductor junction: 
P = kt- 1' 2 , 
where P is the failure power, t is the pulse width (duration), and k is a 
constant. An empirical extension to the case of integrated circuits has the 
form 
P = At' B , 
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where A and B are empir ical ly determined constants. 
Uncertainties have several sources: 
• Use of theoret ical models f o r damage p red ic t i on . 
• Waveform differences between the actual system and the component t e s t . 
• Ranges of d i s t r ibu t ion of f a i l u r e parameters. 
• Def in i t ions of in tegra ted-c i rcu i t damage. 
Theoretical models must resor t to published data on device parameters, 
usually based on junct ion capacitance. Waveform dif ferences are s ign i f i can t 
when a device exhibi ts a lower f a i l u r e level f o r one po la r i t y than the other , 
or when the f a i l u r e level is af fected by repeated pulses of varying p o l a r i t y . 
Testing, however, is usually performed with step-stressing at one p o l a r i t y . 
Sometimes i t i s actually quite d i f f i c u l t to determine when an integrated 
c i r c u i t has f a i l e d . Degradation of certain device parameters is possible 
without catastrophic f a i l u r e . 
A. Experimental Uncertainties in Component Test ing. 
Environment Simulation. Very l i t t l e test ing of components is performed 
with a simulation of the actual in-place or i n - c i r c u i t environment. For 
reasons of economy and ease of generation, test ing i s done pr imar i ly wi th a 
unipolar pulse waveform. A high degree of automation i s employed in t e s t i n g . 
Actual environment waveforms (as observed from system EMP simulation tes ts) 
are nearly always some var ia t ion of a damped sinusoid, wi th a frequency 
content that depends on the system conf igurat ion. 
Instrumentation. Sensing of voltage and current i s not a major source of 
uncertainty. Step-stressing i s commonly used, so large errors are un l i ke l y . 
However, determination of exact t ime of f a i l u re can be a source of e r ro r . 
Pretest instrumentation normally involves an automated parameter-measuring 
tes t set; post test determination of possibly degraded parameters can then be 
evaluated by the same test set , thereby removing an uncertainty through 
standardizing. Absolute errors or uncertaint ies in component use f o r a 
par t icu lar appl icat ion, however, are only as good as the completeness of 
coverage of the or ig ina l parameter t es t set. Measurement and d i g i t i z e r er rors 
have been shown to be less than 25% f o r worst cases and less than 10% f o r rms 
var iat ions. Test methodology and error analysis are discussed in Appendices A 
and B of Ref. 8. 
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6. Uncertainties in Analysis. Chapter 13 on "Component EMP Sensitivity and 
System dpset" of the QUA £MP Handbook also contains some general information 
on uncertainties or accuracy factors of variables as used in analysis. The 
three phases of damage analysis methodology are data acquisition, detailed 
theoretical analysis, and susceptibility screen development. 
uata Acquisition. The detail and quality of data on subsystem, circuits, 
and components available for analysis vary considerably. It is often necessary 
to infer circuit parameters from schematics, and some circuit details may not 
be available. The availability and accuracy of failure parameters for devices 
is one of the most significant constraints in performing an EMP assessment. 
Some methods for obtaining component failure parameters, in addition to doing 
actual testing, are the use of data with the AFWL's code SUPERSAP, the use of 
existing equations (supplemented by measurement), the use of equations and 
certain published data, and the estimation of damage thresholds in various 
gensral categories of devices. Threshold values can easily vary tenfold. 
Detailed Theoretical Analysis. Detailed theoretical analysis at the 
circuit level requires several types of information and tools, each of which 
can involve a large amount of uncertainty. 
The principal tools for complex circuits are the large, general-purpose 
circuit and system codes, such as CIRCUS, NET-2, SCEPTRE, etc. Complete 
circuit simulation is possible in principle, but may be prohibitively costly. 
Much smaller codes, such as HANAP2, are also used. A simplification of the 
circuit to reduce the complexity could omit important responses. A prelim­
inary analysis by an engineer familiar with the design of the circuit will 
conveniently eliminate certain sections or components, but there is uncertainty 
in accounting for the possibility of damaging a "buried" circuit component, 
with no apparent direct connection to the circuit of concern. Judgmental 
errors will arise in the simplification of circuits for analysis. 
Screening for Susceptibility. Screening of subsystems or components for 
hardness uses some method of ranking components for inherent hardness. This 
can be quite simple, involving little un artainty, such as screening out all 
semiconductor circuits as being inherently soft. A more sophisticated screen 
uses values of failure threshold parameters for devices, such as a K (Wunsch 
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constant) value. Lack of proper data concerning a circuit description can 
cause a great amount of uncertainty in all cases. For instance, an assumption 
that a circuit is not a solid-state one, when in fact it must be to function 
properly, would create serious susceptibility uncertainties regardless of the 
method of screening used. 
3.2.3 Summary 
A. Circuits and Subsystems. Sources of uncertainty include: 
e Circuit parameters, specific devices/circuits. 
t Transformer coil nonlinear effects. 
t High-level solid-state device models/response-
• Indirect coupling to "buried" circuits. 
• Simultaneous pin- or port-excitation effects. 
• Power-on vs power-off effects. 
• Function definitions. 
• Stray element effects. 
It would be very difficult in general to quantify the errors associated 
with each item on the above list. Many of these uncertainties depend on the 
level of detail available for the subsystem or circuit being assessed. Cor­
relations of predicted subsystem unit failure thresholds with test results 
indicate that analysis techniques have been generally conservative. Some 
of these results are summarized in Table 3.1. The values represent ratios of 
box-pin-test failure (current and voltage) thresholds (subscript F) to analyt­
ically predicted thresholds (subscript T) for fifteen electronics units from 
eight different subsystems. The posttest comparisons include some modifica­
tions in the analysis, such as component test results, revised information on 
components values, circuits topology, etc., which were absent in the pretest-
predictions. 
In both the AABNCP and EC-135 assessment programs, box-pin tests were 
performed for several boxes. The more recent EC-135 program included a 
summary of box-level data points for both assessment programs, shown in 
Table 3.2. 
The EC-135 prediction data include the effects of semiconductor junction 
bulk resistance, while the AABNCP data do not. The data from the tables 
suggest that the calculated thresholds provide a reliable lower bound for 
subsystem boxes. 
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TABLE 3.1. Comparison of tested failure threshold (F) to theoretical 
thresholds (T) for subsystem electronic boxes (Ref. 5 ) . 
Posttest (revi sed) comparisons Pretest comparisons 
Box I F/lT V F / V T I F/l r Vc 7Vr 
number Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
1 7.88 8 1.2 8 
2 0.64 156 0.92 258 0.64 156 0.6 258 
3 6.7 8.1 8.1 8.6 6.7 8.1 8.1 8.6 
4 0.5 3 5 17 0.5 2.4 1.1 9.6 
5 0.7 >12 >0.3 >0.6 0.7 >12 >l'..3 7.6 
6 1.9 7.5 1.3 3.7 1.9 3.1 0.56 1.6 
7 1.7 12 1.3 4.0 0.35 9 0.17 2.5 
8 78.9 744 71.1 >1.5 
9 1.5 11.3 2.0 3.7 0.7 5.1 4.5 25 
10 1.9 4.2 1.3 2.8 2.4 9.8 1.3 10.7 
11 1.2 1.5 0.44 0.68 0.69 8.5 0.07 3.8 
12 No burnout noted--transmissibility assumptions verified 
13 No burnout thresholds noted--arc-over predictions verified 
14 3.7 37 3 9 8 22 1.8 11 
15 1.17 10.1 2.02 10.1 l.i7 10.1 2.02 10.1 
TABLE 3.2. Summary of box-level data points for two assessment programs (Ref. 2). 
Number of data points 
No. of Test 
boxes Burnouts> Burnouts< stopped> 















B. Components. Sources of uncertainty include: 
• Damage prediction with theoretical models. 
• Waveform differences between the actual system and the component test. 
$ Distribution of thresholds. 
• Definitions of integrated-circuit damage. 
• Unexpected failure modes. 
• Lot-to-lot, manufacturer-to-manufacturer variations, 
t Effect of lead inductances in testing. 
• Unipolar step-stressing quantization error. 
There is much quantitative information on component device threshold 
variability. Chapter 13 cf the DNA EMP Handbook contains information on 
the relative damage susceptibility of electronic components. (The threshold 
ranges for the different general classes of components are shown in Fig. 3.1.) 
The handbook also presents estimated values for K, the damage constant, for 
different device categories. The information includes K m p a n > with upper and 
lower 95% confidence limits, for several types of diodes and transistors. The 
sample size for each type varies from 2 to 56. Nearly all limits are a factor 
of 10 (or more) above or below the K m e a n values. There is also a summary of 
integrated-circuit threshold variations by category. Limits are given for the 
parameter A, in the failure model P = At" 3, for the TTL, RTL, DTL, ECL, MOS, 
and LINEAR families of devices. These limits range from a factor of 2.1 to 13 
abovj or below the A„„,„ values. Such variation will produce variations in mean 
burnout power (1-us pulse width) of 5 to 200 W for all families, and limits 
as high as 6 to 1100 W for one family (LINEAR). 
Data are also available that compare transistor and diode test results with 
predicted damage constants (K factors). For example, the data in Table 3.3 
illustrate the range of ratios of test K factors to predicted K factors for 
the junction capacity prediction model. The other models (thermal resistance) 
have greater variation. Diodes show a greater range of uncertainty, but the 
sample size was small. 
Separate models for classes of devices have also been developed and studied 
g at General Electric Co. One report discusses damage models developed for 
classes of diodes and uses the existing experimental data base for input. 

























'These components exhibit 
a voltage-sensitive failure 
mode. 
10 102 10 3 10* 10 5 
P F at 1 jxs - W 
FIG. 3 . 1 . Range of thresholds (Pp) showing relative damage susceptibilit ies 
of electronic components. The threshold at 1 ys, in kW, is equal to the K 
factor. 
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TABLE 3.3 Comparisons of test K factors to predicted K factors for transistors 
and diodes, using the junction capacity model. 
Tran: s is tors 
Measured 
Col lector-
























0.014 1.7 121 
0.010 1.0 100 
parameters (such as breakdown voltages at low level), and that also provide o 
factors as multipliers. The value of o for I p R (reverse current damage) is 
1.58 for a 1N4148 diode; 2.51 for rectifiers, diodes, and switches; and 2.14 
for zener diodes. In a second report, 252 integrated circuits of several 
types were tested and modeled, with confidence limits as a multipliers 
included. There are models for RTL, DTL, TTL (several types), ECL, and LINEAR 
circuits. Sigma factors range from 1.4 to 4.8 for models tff the form P = 
-B At" . References 9 and 10 should be consulted for the appropriate model to 
be used with each class of device and for each input terminal. 
4.0 COMPARISON OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
An assessment technique, whether based on simulated or full-scale 
testing, system modeling, or analysis, is likely to vary with each problem, 
depending on the circumstances of the assessment. Several factors which 
affect the choice of methodology are: 
• State of system development: is it a new system, deployed system, 
upgraded cr revised system, etc.? 
• Level of knowiedge of the threat or of the system and/or the 
components: to what extent is the environment known, to what extent is the 
system coupling known, what is known about component susceptibility? 
• Availability of resources: what funding, expertise, or time is 
available for the assessment? 
t Other constraints: is the system available for testing, etc.? These 
and other factors influence not only the choice of overall methodology, but 
also the particular techniques used within the framework of the overall method. 
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Whatever the methodology considered, it is important that the technique 
accommodate the many uncertainties that may affect the assessment results. 
Again, it is expected that uncertainties be handled differently in different 
i.iethodologies. Also, the extent to which uncertainties enter into the 
analysis will change from situation to situation. Certainly, the availability 
of inforration regarding the uncertainties in the assessment parameters will 
determine how extensive an analysis of uncertainties is performed. 
The following paragraphs outline briefly some of the methods used in 
vulnerability assessments of large systems. They are followed by a description 
and discussion of how uncertainties are handled within the method. 
4.1 HDL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
One assessment technique is exemplified by the methodology developed and 
used by HDL in the Multiple Systems Evaluation Program (MSEP). This tech­
nique makes heavy use of analytically oriented coupling and circuit-code 
models. Test data on system components and system coupling are used both for 
developing the computer models and as a source of inputs to the system assess­
ment. Uncertainties are included at all stages of the analysis. They include 
uncertainties in the system model, uncertainties in component susceptibility, 
uncertainties in component responses due to modeling, etc. These uncertainties 
are not probabilistically stated, but are used for detailed modeling and calcu­
lations to obtain a worst-case assessment. 
4.2 ROCKWELL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
An alternative assessment method was applied by Rockwell International to 2 an assessment of the EC-135 aircraft. This method is based on measurements 
of the transient currents and voltages in the aircraft while it is in a simula­
ted environment. These currents and voltages were analytically extrapolated 
to threat level, and the dB difference between a component threat current and 
its susceptibility was defined as a "hardness margin" for that component. The 
extrapolation of test data to criterion level was based on extrapolation 
functions determined either from mathematical models or from scale-model tests. 
Uncertainties in the test measurements, susceptibility data, and extrapolation 
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functions were described probabilistically and were propagated throughout the 
analysis, using the methods of statistical error propagation. The final 
assessment results were stated as a reliability-confidence interval. 
4.3 BOEING ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
The Boeing Aerospace Corporation has developed assessment methods to 
predict the communication impairment of communication f a c i l i t i e s in a threat 
12 13 environment. ' The method employs both e l ec t r i ca l and funct ional models. 
The former i s used to determine the input at c r i t i c a l components throughout the 
system. This in turn is compared to the component f a i l u r e threshold to deter­
mine a probab i l i t y of d is rupt ion . These p robab i l i t i es are then applied to the 
functional model to determine a probab i l i t y of communication impairment. 
Uncertainties in inputs, component and system parameters, e tc . , are introduced 
using the concept of "data q u a l i t y . " 
4.4 TRW WORK 
14 In other work, TRW studied the general problem of methodologies for 
vulnerability assessment, specifically as applied to aircraft. Its study 
suggested that all assessment concept alternatives could be obtained by 
answering the following seven basic questions: 
1. What survivability statements constitute an answer in the assessment? 
2. What is the basis for establishing these survival statements? 
3. What is the threshold concept? (How is it characterized and referenced?) 
4. What is the extrapolation concept? (How is coupling to the threshold 
point determined?) 
5. What is the final assessment analysis concept? (What is the technical 
basis for data analysis?) 
6. What is the simulation philosophy? 
7. What is the test object configuration philosophy? 
TRW proceeds in the study to enumerate eleven assessment concepts that 
include three possible threshold reference locations and four possible 
extrapolation concept alternatives: 
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Threshold references 
Tl. Pressure hull interface. 
T2. Pressure hull (damage), subsystem box interface (upset). 
T3. Subsystem box interface. 
Extrapolation concept 
El. Analytical model. 
E2. Hybrid analytical model. 
E3. Direct extrapolation of system test data by scalar multiplier. 
E4. Threat-level direct drive on portions of the system, based on subthreat 
excitation of total system. 
Only the combination of T3 and El was considered not viable due to state-
of-the-art limitations in internal coupling analyses. The purpose of this 
phase of the study was to develop the concepts and to identify data and tech­
nology needed to implement these concepts. TRW did not choose an optimum 
candidate concept. 
One method based on the concepts outlined by TRW is a probabilistic 
analysis that makes extensive use of simulation to assess system survivability. 
One version of the probabilistic analysis, as applied by LLNL to two simple 
systems, is described in Section 5. With regard to uncertainties, the prob­
abilistic analysis distinguishes between random and systematic uncertainties 
in all assessment variables. For any fixed systematic error, the effect of 
random variations on the value of the probability of survival is assessed by 
Monte Carlo methods. The result is an estimate of the probability of survival. 
By varying the systematic error, a distribution of estimates can be generated. 
In turn, a confidence interval (or confidence bound) can be evaluated from this 
distribution. The final result is an estimate of the probability of survival, 
stated with a measure of confidence. This method relies heavily on computer 
modeling, both in terms of the inputs (threat, system parameters, system opera­
tion, etc.) and the uncertainties (random and systematic). Thus, TRW has 
developed several computer c o d e s 1 4 , 1 5 ' 1 6 (e.g., SANE, SURVIVE, FAST) to perform 
this type of analysis. Many simplifying assumptions have been made in develop­
ing these codes, hence the applicability of such codes to vulnerability assess­
ment is questionable. One of the purposes of the LLNL study was to determine 
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whether a probabilistic analysis, based on a computer model (FAST), would 
generate estimates that could be verified by laboratory experiments for simple 
systems. TRW has recently applied this type of methodology to assess the 
survivability of a radio system when subject to the EMP of a high-altitude 
burst. 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
All of the methodologies outlined above consider uncertainties in the 
assessment variables, but the degree to which these uncertainties affect the 
analysis and the types of results differs considerably among methods. The HDL 
approach to uncertainties is, as taken in MSEP, the simplest. The quantity of 
real interest in this approach is the largest value of the uncertainty. This 
is used in a worst-case analysis to evaluate the worst-case margin of safety, 
thus resulting in a conservative assessment. This type of assessment indicates 
the vulnerability in an extreme situation; it fails to recognize that such a 
situation occurs with a very low probability. Also, no matter what value is 
used for the largest uncertainty, it is likely that this is not an absolute 
upper bound. Instead, it is likely to be a value that will not be exceeded 
with high probability. Thus, the HDL approach may not in fact produce a worst-
case analysis. The methodologies used by Rockwell and Boeing, and suggested by 
TRW, treat uncertainties as probabilistic quantities: the values of the uncer­
tainties are assumed to be described by a probability distribution. Boeing 
introduces uncertainties in the assessment variables through a factor called 
"data quality" (DQ). It is assumed that the uncertainty in the safety margin 
(the logarithm of the ratio of the failure threshold signal to the response 
signal) is due to one of three types of variation: 
1. Random variation among similar units, which assumes that the "true" 
population safety margin is known. 
2. System variation in the safety margin of the specific unit being tested. 
3. Systematic plus random variation in the observed safety margin. 
The distribution in the safety margin, as described by DQ, is used to 
evaluate the probability of unit survival in case 1 or to evaluate the "confi-
timzH* that the unit survives in cases 2 and 3. These probabilities (or 
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confidences) are combined to evaluate the corresponding measure of system 
survivability. The initial analyses done by Boeing assumed that the distribu­
tional parameters are known. Later work extended the methodology to 
include situations in which the parameters are estimated from sample data 
("extended data quality") and/or mathematical modeling is used to predict the 
inputs into the vulnerability assessment ("model prediction coefficient"). 
This method of accommodating uncertainties, as used by Boeing, relies on 
a single measure to describe uncertainty, whether it is random or systematic. 
Thus, the effect of these uncertainties cannot be separated in sensitivity 
analyses. Also, in extending the methodology to include mathematical modeling 
uncertainties and parameter estimation uncertainties, a simplifying assumption 
of Gaussian variation was made. This restricts the applicability of the 
method. Further, the use of the term "confidence" is specialized and could 
lead to confusion with the more common meaning of the term. 
Rockwell uses a reliability-confidence interval as a measure of 
uncertainty in a variable. We define it as follows: 
A B 100% - y TOO^ reliability-confidence interval 
for a variable I, given by +AI, means that, based on 
test data, if I Q is the "nominal" value of I, then 
one is y ^ O ^ confident that at least B 100% of the 
values of I within the appropriate population will be 
in the interval (I - AI, I + AI) o ' o ' 
Thus, reliability-confidence intervals are statements of bounds between 
which a stated percentage of values of a variable can be expected to lie. The 
"quality" of the methods used to determine these bounds is expressed by the 
confidence statement. In contrast with Boeing's use of the term "confidence," 
the usage here is consistent with that usually found in the statistical liter­
ature. Rockwell's definition of the term "reliability" is a generalization of 
the term as it is used in system and component reliability theory. Their def­
inition also includes the more common daily and legal applications, e.g.» "That 
statement, or testimony, is highly reliable." See Ref. 18 for a definition of 
"reliability" as used by Rockwell. In particular, in the context of the reli­
ability-confidence interval for a variable I, Rockwell uses reliability to 
denote a lower bound on the probability that variable I will be within a 
specified interval. If I denotes the safety margin of a system and the 
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interval is all values above zero, then Rockwell's use of the terra reliability 
coincides with the use conventional in the world of system and component 
reliability theory. 
Reliability-confidence intervals for all input variables are assumed 
inputs to the assessment analysis. These variables (and intervals) are analy­
tically combined to evaluate the safety margin (and interval) for individual 
components. These are ultimately combined for a system safety margin determin­
ation. The final output is an estimated lower bound for the probability that 
the system safety margin is greater than zero, where the estimate is given 
with a specified level of confidence. One major problem with the approach 
used by Rockwell in accommodating uncertainties is the method used for combin­
ing uncertainties. Two types of reliability-confidence intervals are develop­
ed, one assuming Gaussian variables and the other a nonparametric interval. 
Interval half-widths (errors) are combined as the square root of the sum of 
squares, even when a Gaussian variable is combined with a non-Gaussian variable. 
There is some question about the resulting confidence level. (This same 
question exists even when combining the same types of intervals.) Also, 
concerning the distinction between systematic and random uncertainties, 
Rockwell found only one variable to have significant systematic uncertainty in 
the EC-135. That variable, threshold current, was corrected for its estimated 
bias (approximately 12 dB). Thus, the only uncertainties combined in 
constructing the final reliability-confidence interval for the EC-135 were 
random uncertainties. For a somewhat more detailed treatment of these and 
other difficulties in the Rockwell approach, see Ref. 19. 
5.0 A METHODOLOGY BASED ON PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS 
As indicated in the discussion of alternative vulnerability assessment 
methodologies, any realistic assessment must take into consideration the 
uncertainties in the assessment variables. A method based on a worst-case 
assessment, though it may be practical, is rot realistic, since it deals with 
a situation that generally has a very low probability of occurring. The more 
realistic approach is to recognize the variation in the uncertainties. A con­
venient method for describing this variation is a probability distribution. 
Thus, the tools of probability should be used in the assessment methodology. 
Two of the methods described in Section 4 use probability to handle uncertain­
ties, but they inadequately separate the effects of random and systematic 
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uncertainties, and their methods for combining uncertainties in several vari­
ables are suspect. 
A methodology that recognizes the variation in variable uncertainties and 
that does not have the deficiencies mentioned above is based on the use of 
Monte Carlo methods to analyze the effect of uncertainties in the assessment 
variables. A flow diagram illustrating such an approach is given in Fig. 5.1. 
This approach relies heavily on computer models to describe the coupling (both 
exterior and interior) for a system. Inputs are assumed to be environmental 
data (e.g., EMP electric field data generated by EMP codes), coupling models 
with appropriate system parameter values, component susceptibility data 
(perhaps developed from test data), and finally, a system model consistent 
with the assessment goal. Thus, the system model may depend on whether the 
aim is to assess vulnerability, hardening, or survivability (the ability to 
complete a specified mission when subject to a given threat). Additional 
important inputs are the probability distributions that describe the variation 
in the uncertainties associated with each of the assessment variables. 
Separate distributions are used for each type of uncertainty (random, 


















FIG. 5 . 1 . Elements of a probabilistic approach for handling uncertainties. 
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For fixed values of each systematic (or judgmental) uncertainty, chosen at 
random from the distribution of such uncertainty, the environment confronting 
a system is simulated by randomly selecting a random uncertainty for the 
environmental variable. In propagating the environmental variable through the 
coupling model, the tools of reliability theory are used to determine the 
probability of the component surviving by comparing the input to the component 
with the component failure threshold. The survival probabilities for all the 
system components are then combined, using the system model, to determine the 
probability of system survival. Iterating through this procedure and averaging 
all the probabilities provides an estimate of the expected probability of 
survival (or failure) for the given systematic (or judgmental) uncertainty. 
This is an estimate of the probability that the system will survive when 
confronted by a threat. 
This procedure is repeated for additional values of the systematic (or 
judgmental) uncertainties, and thus a distribution of values of the estimated 
probability of survival is generated. The average value, taken from this 
distribution, is the point estimate of the probability of survival for the 
system. This average is taken over all possible variations of the environment 
and component susceptibility, as well as uncertainties in modeling, testing, 
judgment, etc. In addition, the distribution generated in this way can be 
used to present a range of values for the probability of survival. Although 
the discussion of this approach has concentrated on taking averages, it is 
possible to use other measures, for example, the probability of survival 
exceeded in at least a certain percentage (e.g., 95%) of cases with respect to 
the random uncertainty. The important thing to recognize is that this approach 
realistically measures system performance in the environments it is likely to 
encounter, because it accounts for both the magnitude of the threat and the 
frequency of its occurrence. 
One variation of this approach has been applied to two simple systems at 
LLNL. These analyses used the computer program FAST to sample the random 
and systematic uncertainties, and the circuit/systems computer program L -2 
to develop some of the internal coupling data. Both of these programs have 
shortcomings (e.g., FAST assumes a linear transfer function to describe 
coupling), but their use illustrates the methodology described above. In fact, 
the output of this type of assessment compares well with experimentally based 
data. These results are discussed in the next section. 
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6.0 VALIDATION EXPERIMENTS 
The first validation experiment used EMP radiation of a monopole antenna 
with a microwave diode load. The second used a transistor multivibrator 
circuit, which was driven by a potentially damaging electrical pulse. Both 
experiments, though simple, had the features necessary for validating the 
probabilistic approach. We obtained input data for the FAST computer program 
from the experiments and from numerical calculations. We used FAST to predict 
the overall system probability of failure, as a function of the applied 
environmental stress. 
6.1 MONOP0LE/DI0DE EXPERIMENT 
We assembled a monopole antenna with a diode load on the LLL Transient 
Electromagnetic Range, 2 0 as illustrated in Fig. 6.1. This simple system 
embodies all of the ingredients needed to demonstrate the application of the 
FAST program to assessment. Device burnout is specified by diode fragility 
curves, the environment appears as the incident electromagnetic field (from 
the monocone pulse antenna), and the network transfer function relates the 
incident field level to the energy collected by the monopole antenna and 
delivered to the diode load. 
The experiment provided simple systems tests. If the amplitude of the 
5-ns pulse generated by the pulser, radiated to the monopole, and delivered to 
the diode load is sufficently large, the diode will burn out. In each test, 
only one pulse was delivered to the diode load and each diode load was used 
only once. At each level of environmental stress (the incident electromagnetic 
field), FAST predicts the probability of system failure. Therefore, the 
experiment was performed for three different levels of field intensity, with a 
sample lot of 26 diodes in each case. Failure of a diode was defined as a 
12-fold increase in reverse leakage current. 
6.1.1 Fragility Curves 
To determine fragility curves, it was necessary to obtain failure data 
for the 1N23B point-contact microwave diode that was applicable in the short-
pulse (5-ns) region. We performed separate tests to obtain these data. Four 
hundred devices were tested in the configuration illustrated in Fig. 6.2. 
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The burnout criterion was based on the distribution of leakage current or 234 
devices before testing. The mean leakage current was 7.0 uA, with a sample 
standard deviation of 5.93 uft. The test configuration of Fig. 6.2 uses a 
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FIG. 6.2. Arrangement used to obtain short-pulse diode burnout data (adapted 
from Ref. 20). 
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mercury pulse generator with adjustable pulse amplitude and a 5-ns pulse 
width. Energy delivered to the coaxial line {in joules) is expressed as 
ELINE=J " ? — d t' 
0 ° 
where T is the pulse width in seconds, V is the pulse voltage (attenuated 
by a factor of 10), and ZQ is the l ine impedance (50 a). The diode was 
mounted into a coaxial f ix ture and probes CT-l and CT-3 were used to monitor 
current in the diode and voltage on the l ine with the diode. The attenuator 
diminished reflected pulses between the load and the pulse generator. 
We performed the diode tests at several levels to obtain estimates of the 
f rag i l i t y curves over several percentiles. Twenty-six diodes were single-pulse 
tested at each voltage level {52 were tested at 80 V), and checked for fa i lure. 
A summary of the results is shown in Table 6 .1 . 
Point and 90% confidence interval estimates for the probabil i ty of fa i lu re , 
Pf, are based on the following formulas: 
Pf = number of diodes fa i l ing , 
n 
(Pf,r P f . u ^ ^ f ^ 1 ' 
where n is the number of diodes tested. These estimates are given in the last 
two columns of Table 6.1. Empirical cumulative distribution functions based 
on these estimates are given in Fig. 6.3. The middle curve is the best 
estimate of the diode fragility, based on the estimates of p-. Figure 6.3 
also shows the lower and upper limits on the fragility due to the systematic 
uncertainty of estimating it from test data. 
6.1.2 Transfer Function 
We obtained the transfer function that relates the incident electro­
magnetic field level at the monopole to the energy delivered to the diode 
22 load, with the help of the computer program WT-MBA/LLL1B. This program 
permits the modeling of wire structures, such as the monopole, with a series 
of short interconnected segments. The numerical model of the 1.13-m monopole 
over a ground plane resembles a 2.26-m dipole in free space, with a 100-n 
fa1 - gf' , , V . ) 
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Pulse Number Number probability probability 
voltage, V* Energy, J tested failed^ of failure (pf) of failure 
15 2.25 x 10"8 26 1 0.038 (0, 0.104) 
30 9-0 x 10" 8 26 4 0. 154 (0.033, 0.270) 
40 1.6 x 10" 7 26 9 0.346 (0.195, 0.497) 
45 2.025 x 10"' 26 16 0.615 (0.459, 0.771) 
50 2.5 x 10" 7 26 18 0.692 (0.544, 0.849) 
60 3.6 x 10" 7 26 19 0.731 (0.588, 0.874) 
80 6.4 x 10" 7 52 44 0.827 (0.738, 0.916) 
100 1.0 x 10" 6 26 25 0.962 (0.896, 1.0) 
aPulse voltage is voltage into coax leading to diode and is equal to the 
mercury pulser voltage divided by 10. 
bDiode failure occurs if reverse leakage current exceeds 84 viA. 
10 20 70 80 40 50 60 
Voltage - V 
FIG. 6.3. Estimated failure distribution functions. 
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100 
load as its center. Figure 6.4 shows the calculated voltage across one half 
of the 100-ft load f c a 1 V/m electric field amplitude, plane-wave incidence, 
1-ns rise and fall times, and a 5-ns pulse width (FWHM). The cumulative energy 
delivered to the 50-ft load is shown in Fig. 6.5 for the positive half cycles. 
-12 
The asymptotic value of 1.35 x 10 J was used in the transfer function for 
FAST. 
6.1.3 Results 
To evaluate the assessment methodology, we took two approaches to develop 
data for comparison with the probabilistic estimate of system failure. One 
source of data was the experiment involving the monopole/dipole network shown 
in Fig. 6.1. The diode fixture and cable attached to the monopole are the 
same as that used in establishing the diode burnout data. Three levels of 
incident electric field, 256 V/m, 372 V/m, and 460 V/m, wera used in the 
experiment. At each level, 26 diodes were tested. The results of the tests 
are summarized in Table 6.2. 
A second source of validation data was an analytical computation of the 
probability of system failure. This analysis was based on the assumption that 
both the diode failure threshold and the energy applied to the system are log-
normal random variables. This assumption is consistent with the experimental 
data, and the values of the parameters of the probability distributions were 
derived from these data. The analysis is based on the fact that the probabil­
ity of system failure, p f, can be computed from the relationship 
P f = P(E > T) 
• • M 
• P[(ln E - In T)1> 0 , 
where E denotes the applied energy and T denotes the failure threshold. Since 
both E and T are lognormal random variables, the difference, 
W = In E - In T , 
is a normal random variable. Thus, the probability of failure is the probabil­
ity that W, with the appropriate mean and variance, is greater than zero. 
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12.5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Time — 10 _ 8 s 
FIG. 6.4. Calculated voltage across a 50-J2 load f o r a 2.26-m dipole. 
2 3 4 5 6 
Time — 10~8s 
FIG. 6.5. Cumulative energy into a 50-fi load on a 1.13-m monopole 
for a 5-ns, I-V/m incident plane-wave pulse. 
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TABLE 6.2. Measured failures for monopole/diode experiment. 
80% confidence 
Incident No. No. Estimated inter va1 Is for 
electric Pulser of diodes of diodes probability probability of 
Field, V/m voltage tested failed of failure failure 
256 517 26 5 0.192 (0.093, 0.291) 
372 752 26 15 0.58 (0.453, 0.701) 
460 929 26 18 0.692 (0.576, 0.808) 
The results of this probabilistic analysis based on the FAST program are 
summarized in Table 6.3. The inputs into the FAST program were the environ­
ment, transfer function, and fragility data described earlier. The output of 
the program is the probability distribution for p,, the probability of system 
failure. Selected percentiles of the output distribution are the entries in 
Table 6.3. Reasonable point estimates of P f are the 50th percentiles, 0.135, 
0.490 and 0.679 for 256, 372 and 460 V/m respectively, of the distribution of 
A summary of the comparison of the experimental and analytical results 
with the probabilistic results are presented in Table 6.4. In general there 
is good agreement between the validation results and the estimate based on the 
probabilistic analysis using FAST. Of course, this comparison involves a very 
simple system. The experimental estimate of p, is highest at all three elec­
tric fields, indicating a possible bias in one or more of the methods. Several 
factors affect the comparison: 
e The experimental estimate is based on a relatively small sample of 26 
units (at each field intensity). 
• The analytical approach assumed lognormal distributions (an approximation). 
• In the probabilistic analysis, all systematic uncertainties were 
considered negligible except those associated with the fragility curves 
for the diode. 
6.2 MULTIVIBRATOR EXPERIMENT 
In the multivibrator experiment, we used both available analysis tools 
and an existing component data base in combination with laboratory tests for 
the validation study. For analysis and experiment, a conventional two-battery-
biased, collector-coupled monostable multivibrator circuit, using two 2N918 
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TABLE 6.3. Percentiles, P a, of the probability distribution of pf, the 
probability of system failure, at three incident electric fields. 
Probability Percentiles (P ) 








at 256 V/m at 372 V/m at 460 V/n 
0.056 0.313 0.513 
0.102 0.388 0.607 
0.118 0.441 0.658 
0.135 0.490 0.679 
0.155 0.528 0.700 
0.217 0.583 0.750 
0.337 0.675 0.838 
TABLE 6.4. Comparison of experimental, analytical, and probabilistic results. 
Probability of fail ure (pf) 
Electric field, V/m Experimental Analytical Probabilistic (FAST) 
256 0.192 0.172 0.135 
372 0.580 0.460 0.490 
460 0.692 0.645 0.679 
transistors, was contrived. This circuit was modeled and analyzed with version 
9.1 of the computer program NET-2. Published failure data 2 3 on the 2N918 
were used to set the component fragility. In the laboratory tests, the multi­
vibrator was subjected to a stress environment of electrical pulses, injected 
through diodes into the base of each of the transistors, to verify the analytic 
predictions of failure obtained from the NET-2 simulation results. The config­
uration used for the laboratory tests is shown in Fig. 6.6. 
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pulse 0.5 fis, 5 V 
m»-


















— 1 fis, -650 V 
FIG. 6.6. Test configuration for multivibrator circuit burnout experiment. 
6.2.1 Circuit Analysis with NET-2 
A preliminary examination of the multivibrator circuit indicated that 
the transistors would be the components most susceptible to burnout. Previous 
23 
data on the 2N918 show that failure is likely for reverse voltages near 
13.5 V for the emitter-base junction, for a 1-us pulse width, with failure 
currents of 0.4 to 0.5 A. After some preliminary runs with NET-2 established 
the magnitude of the required burnout pulse, Epu-ige> we analyzed the circuit 
with the Monte Carlo option of the code. A 100-sample Monte Carlo solution 
was found for a fixed point in time (5.75 us), where only the parameters 
V B£ (breakdown voltage), Rg E, and E p u l s e were varied. These parameters 
are highly significant in the failure predictions, and Gaussian parameter 
distributions were used to represent their variations. An average value of 
8.7 V for V „ was calculated from previous results, and the average value of 
R B£ was estimated as 10 ft. The 3a points for NET-2 were 1.1 V and 5 fl. 
The pulser voltage was varied between 64 and 68 V. 
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Table 6.5 presents an example of the output quantities calculated by NET-2. 
According to these predictions, fa i lure is about equally l ike ly for the two 
transistors. 
6.2.2 FAST Analysis 
Using the output of NET-2, we developed fragility curves for the transistors 
(similar to the curves illustrated in Fig. 6.3). The uncertainty limits were 
based on confidence interval estimates of the mean. The environmental data used 
were the E p u l s e values with a nominal voltage of 65 V. The estimate of the 
probability of system survival, p s , based on the probabilistic analysis, is 
0.368. 
6.2.3 Experimental Results 
Laboratory tests were performed on the multivibrator circuit, using the 
arrangement shown in Fig 6.6. The Hewlett-Packard pulse generator was used 
to check the normal operation of the monostable circuit. Each time the 0.5-ys 
pulser is actuated, a 10-ps pulse is observed in the output from the multivi­
brator. Initial burnout tests were performed at 65 V at the output of the 10 x 
attenuator connected to the mercury pulser. Only a single burnout pulse was 
applied to the circuit. After each pulse, the cicuit was considered to have 
survived if it continued to function normally. Transistors Tl and T2 were 
replaced after each test. The replaced transistors were subsequently checked 
TABLE 6.5. Breakdown voltages across the base-emitter junctions of two tran­
sistors, calculated by NET-2. 
Breakdown voltage ( V B E ) , V 












on a curve tracer to determine which device had burned out. Based on this 
functional criterion, 3 out of 20 circuits survived; thus, the experimental 
estimate of survival is p s = 0.4. This agrees closely with the estimate 
based on the FAST code, particularly since only 20 units were tested 
experimentally. 
Since the fragility data were based on an assumption of failure whenever 
the beta gain factor of a transistor exceeded a 10% degradation, a second 
experiment involving 40 circuits was run using the 10% degradation as the 
failure criterion. At this level, the circuit can still function; thus, an 
estimate of the probability of survival based on 10% degradation is close to a 
lower bound of the survival probability. Among the 40 circuits tested, 11 
survived using this criterion; thus, the estimate of the probability of 
survival is p = 0.275. This figure is lower than both the FAST estimate 
and the estimate based on a functional criterion of failure. However, since 
about half of the circuits continued to function after failure (using the 10% 
degradation criterion), this level of gain degradation is not a realistic 
failure criterion for this circuit. 
7.0 HARDENING AND PROTECTION OPTIONS 
A probabilistic design methodology is a logical way to approach vulner­
ability assessment analysis and hardness specification. There are different 
options to consider when one is faced with assessing and hardening systems in 
quite different stages of development. The emphasis here will be more on 
assessment for hardening when the system is already developed or fielded. The 
hardening options will necessarily be tied closely to the results of assessment 
and to the penalties that would be incurred by a redesign or retrofit for 
hardening purposes. Actual hardening options for existing systems may be quite 
limited. In the extreme, an operational change may be necessary. A new design 
would be most flexible in terms of system engineering studies for hardening 
options. In all cases, however, it is a question of choosing the appropriate 
set of hardening options when faced with given operating constraints. 
There are several types of protection methods available, one or all of 
which may be used in a particular protection option. A system protection 
design approach, referred to as "apportionment of protection," is often used. 
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The idea is to distribute the protection so as to avoid a heavy reliance on a 
single protection method, such as a shield. A well-balanced apportionment 
scheme would appear to offer the least risk from an uncertainties viewpoint, 
as significant factors of safety could overcome the variations in each method 
used in the apportionment scheme. I f uncertainties could be quantified su f f i ­
ciently and i f the system protection and environment interaction were su f f i ­
ciently well understood, then the probabilistic approach could be used to 
overcome the heavy reliance on safety factors in protection. 
8.0 SUMMARY 
In this paper, we examined the general problem of uncertainties and their 
impact on high-altitude EMP vulnerabil i ty assessment of mil i tary systems. 
Typical uncertainties in coupling and susceptibility have been presented. 
Furthermore, the main methodologies used in vulnerability assessment have been 
reviewed and their respective handling of the uncertainties discussed. One 
such methodology, based on probabil istic techniques, has been part ial ly va l i ­
dated at LLNL with two simple system tests, and the results were discussed. In 
addition, we discussed stat ist ical test techniques used to obtain the necessary 
data to formulate the vulnerability issue in a probabilistic framework. 
Coupling uncertainties can be quite high. For example, uncertainties in 
test data for internal cable currents of aircraft can be as high as _+20 dB for 
tests in a ful l-scale free-f ield simulator. This includes measurement, extra­
polation, and intersystem and intrasystem uncertainties, a l l combined as the 
square root of the sum of squares. The coupling uncertainty wi l l be even 
higher i f analytical techniques are used. 
Inherent var iabi l i ty in the threshold fai lure levels of components when 
subjected to certain types of electromagnetic environments is a large source 
of uncertainty in doing a subsystem assessment. Frequently, more closely con­
trol led features of a circuit that surrounds a component cause less variation 
in the susceptibility at a set of c i rcu i t interface terminals than would be 
observed in the component a one. Component parts may have one or two orders 
of magnitude of uncertainty in fa i lu re levels unless subject to parts control 
procedures. Past programs have shown that calculated threshold levels consti­
tute a high-rel iabi l i ty lower bound on true thresholds as determined by tests. 
Failure test data also indicate margins of the order of +13 dB for aircraft-
type equipment. 
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There is considerable diversity in methodologies applied to assessing the 
vulnerabilities of systems to EMPs. This is particularly true of how uncer­
tainties in the assessment variables are treated, especially how uncertainties 
are combined for the ultimate evaluation of margins of safety and probabilities 
of survival. One method based on probabilistic analysis offers an efficient 
way of combining uncertainties with a minimum of assumptions. Thus, many of 
the shortcomings of the more analytical methods are avoided. In this study, 
estimates (based on probabilistic analysis) of the probabilities of survival 
for two simple systems compared favorably to experimental results. This 
indicates that an assessment method based on probabilistic analysis has poten­
tial for effectively accommodating uncertainties in the assessment variables. 
As far as uncertainty reduction is concerned, reduction in certain areas 
seems much more plausible than in others. In coupling, reduction of measure­
ment uncertainties depends largely on novel simulator and probe technology. 
The largest payoff, however, will be improved extrapolation techniques, 
improved cable layout control to minimize intersystem differences, and the 
conducting of tests in the power-on mode. In the susceptibility domain, with 
strict control of components and circuits configuration, the uncertainties can 
perhaps be reduced to +6 dB. 
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